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Abstract - This paper is a critical introduction to the new wave of economic literature on the effect of social 
interactions on individual behavior and aggregate economic outcomes. I refer to this research program, also 
known as new social economics, as the socioeconomic analysis of behavior, to distinguish it from the more 
popular economic analysis of social behavior. I discuss the main features of so-called interactions-based models, 
and I show how they help us to understand substantive economic phenomena. In order to restrict the focus, I 
choose five possible applications: matching in the labor market, welfare participation, poverty traps and 
inequality, investor behavior, and consumer behavior. Then I dwell upon two key undecided questions: (i) why 
economic behavior is affected by social interactions, and (ii) how the social context is shaped by rational 
individuals. Finally, I briefly discuss the main empirical routes so far used. 
 
JEL Classification Codes: D10, D85, Z13, Z19 
 
Keywords: new social economics, social interactions, neighborhood effects, social networks, social norms, 
social multiplier. 
 
Acknowledgements: I am grateful to Ethan Cohen-Cole and Benedetto Gui for useful comments, and to Steven 
Durlauf for numerous conversations about this topic. Of course I am responsible for all remaining errors and 
nonsense. I am also grateful to the Department of Economics of UW-Madison for its hospitality. This research is 
supported by a grant from the Program of Fellowships for Junior Scholars, MacArthur Research Network on 





Giulio Zanella, Department of Economics, Università di Siena, and University of Wisconsin-Madison. 
 
 
 Economists study the actions of individuals, but study them in relation
to social rather than individual life (Marshall, 1949, p. 25)
-Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics, 1890
1 Introduction
Social scientists are familiar with the economic analysis of social behavior,
i.e. the application of standard microeconomic analysis to phenomena which
are not, directly, economic phenomena, such as mating, divorce, sexual be-
havior, crime, and addiction. Such an application is a natural consequence
of the evolution of neoclassical economics: once a theory of human behavior
is built, there is no reason why it should remain conﬁned to a particular do-
main of human action. A diﬀerent enterprise is the socioeconomic analysis of
behavior, i.e. the consideration of both individual incentives and social inter-
actions as determinants of individual behavior. I group under this label re-
search referred to as new social economics, and social interactions economics
(see Durlauf and Young, 2001). By social interactions I am referring to di-
rect interdependencies, not mediated by markets and enforceable contracts,
between individual decisions and the decisions and characteristics of others
within a common sociological group (Brock and Durlauf, 2001a and 2003).
In this sense this kind of analysis is both economic and social. Sometimes the
more popular expression “neighborhood eﬀects” is used, but the geographic
meaning of such an expression may be misleading. Indeed, what matters in
social interactions models is the existence of a “social metric space”, i.e. a
set of individuals and a social distance function (see Akerlof, 1997). In order
to appreciate the diﬀerence between economic and socioeconomic analysis of
behavior, one can contrast two diﬀerent explanations of the sharp increase
in out-of-wedlock childbearing in the US and Europe after the early 1960s.
Willis (1999) explains such phenomenon in terms of pure economic forces:
t h ei n c r e a s ei nf e m a l el a b o rf o r c ep a r t i cipation, and the rise in female-male
income ratio shifted the marriage market equilibrium into a state where men
optimally free ride on women in the upbringing of children, which causes the
out-of-wedlock rate to raise. On the contrary, Crane (1991), who refers to
teenage childbearing, explains such phenomenon through a theory of peer
inﬂuences: when individuals, because of sociological forces, are aﬀected by
others’ choices, particular behaviors can spread like an epidemics. Beyond a
critical threshold the epidemics explode, and the incidence of such behaviors
1shifts from a low- to a high-frequency equilibrium. Both explanations are
consistent with aggregate data, but they have diﬀerent comparative statics
properties, and diﬀerent policy implications. If Willis’ explanation is correct,
then a shock that hits a particular subset of women when the labor market
is stationary should have no aggregate eﬀects beyond the sum of individual
responses in the subset. But this is not true if the underlying process is
an epidemic one. Therefore, the out-of-wedlock rate can be reduced in the
ﬁrst case through any tax scheme that reduces men’s gains from free riding.
Furthermore, the tax scheme should be permanent. In the second case, such
at a xm a yb ei n e ﬀective, and a policy maker whose goal is to reduce out-
of-wedlock childbearing should organize large and widespread interventions,
e.g. information campaigns, so to push the system into a desirable and sta-
ble equilibrium. At that point, the intervention can be ceased. Of course
the two explanations are not mutually exclusive, but there is an important
diﬀerence. While the economic analysis of social behavior enlarges the do-
main of economics, the socioeconomic analysis deepens its foundations, since
it draws from sociology, social psychology, evolutionary biology and political
sciences. As such the two programs set complementary research agendas,
but the latter is still in its infancy. Although neither of the two requires
any substantial departure from the neoclassical paradigm, studying the ef-
fects of social inﬂuences on economic behavior raises several theoretical and
econometric issues. The goal of this paper is to oﬀer a synthetic, accessible,
and critical introduction to the socioeconomic analysis of behavior, and to
show how it helps us to understand substantive economic phenomena. Sev-
eral surveys of the contributions to this large research area have already been
written. Among these are Kirman (1997), Durlauf (2003b), Jackson (2003),
and Verbrugge (2003). In order to avoid duplications, I will work out issues
which are complementary to those these authors have already discussed. Af-
ter a sketch of the evolution of the role of social interactions in economics
(section 2), I present and discuss the main features (section 3) and economic
applications (section 4) of so-called interactions-based models. Then I fo-
cus on two specular, and unresolved, questions: (i) why social interactions
should aﬀect economic behavior (section 5)? And (ii) can economic behav-
ior aﬀect the kind of social interactions one experiences (section 6)? Finally,
I discuss the main econometric issues involved in the empirical analysis of
social interactions, and the main solutions so far implemented (section 7).
22 Economic and social interactions
One of the main goals of microeconomics, for a long time identiﬁed with
general equilibrium theory, is to account for one of the most fascinating hy-
pothesis in social theory, namely Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” conjecture.
Essentially, this is a conjecture about the social optimality of a system of
competitive markets when individuals are self-interested. Theoretical eﬀorts
to account rigorously for such an hypothesis, culminated in the proof that a
general economic equilibrium exists, ﬁrst by Abraham Wald and then by Ar-
row and Debreu, and in the two fundamental theorems of welfare economics.
Choices had to be made about the kind of interactions between agents that
are relevant for market outcomes. Since the question concerns markets, and
for the sake of mathematical tractability, it was a natural working hypothesis
to assume that only market interactions, i.e. those mediated by prices and
enforceable contracts, matter. However, as one expands the set of plausible
interactions that are relevant for market outcomes, the optimality result of
the ﬁrst fundamental theorem doesn’t hold in general: a competitive equilib-
rium is not necessarily Pareto optimal. The reason is that social interactions,
being a form of non-market interdependence, generate externalities. Further-
more, in presence of social eﬀects, the traditional micro-macro relationship
breaks down: for given micro characteristics multiple aggregate equilibria are
possible, and we cannot recover the former from the observed macro equi-
librium. This was ﬁrst pointed out in a pioneering paper by Föllmer (1974),
who built on previous work by Hildenbrand (1971). Hildenbrand allowed for
random preferences and random endowments in a general equilibrium model,
and showed that, by some law of large numbers, a unique equilibrium vec-
tor of prices still exists in the limit. Föllmer added non-market interactions
to randomness, allowing for interdependent preferences and interdependent
constraints across individuals. The result was that the law of large num-
bers breaks down when interactions are suﬃciently wide-range and strong
enough. In this case the microeconomic characteristics of the economy no
longer determine univocally the macroeconomic outcome. Thomas Schelling
(1971, 1978) had already shown that when individual preferences have a so-
cial component, unexpected aggregate results are possible. For instance, in
his celebrated segregation model, Schelling (1971) showed that if people have
no preference for segregation, but they want to be within a certain distance
from certain other individuals, then the very segregated state is an equilib-
rium. Clearly, from such a macro outcome, one cannot recover the individual
3motives that generated it. Such results were suggestive of the possible impor-
tance of social interactions in macroeconomics. However, this couldn’t be a
very compelling research direction at a time when the problem of the micro-
foundations of macroeconomics was still in its infancy. At present, much of
the research on social interactions in economics is motivated, beyond its pure
theoretical glamour, by the belief that social eﬀects on individual behavior
are empirically relevant, and have important macroeconomic consequences
that haven’t received adequate attention so far. In this sense, Loury (1998),
among others, has vividly expressed the importance of non-market interac-
tions, stressing that
each individual is socially situated, and one’s location within the
network of social aﬃliations substantially aﬀects one’s access to
various resources. Opportunity travels along the synapses of these
social networks. Thus, a newborn is severely handicapped if its
parents are relatively uniterested in (or incapable of) fostering the
youngster’s intellectual development in the ﬁrst years of life. A
talented adolescent whose social peer group disdains the activities
that must be undertaken for that talent to ﬂourish is at risk
of not achieving full potential. An unemployed person without
friends or relatives in a certain industry may never hear about the
job opportunities available there. An individual’s inherited social
situation plays a major role in determining ultimate economic
success. (Loury, 1998, p. 119)
The revival of such awareness has brought several economists closer to
the boundary between diﬀerent social sciences, where complementary expla-
nations of individual behavior can be fruitfully integrated. Such integration,
as opposed to mere export of economic analysis, is a fascinating intellec-
tual challenge for social scientists. An important step towards this goal is
the introduction into economics of concepts which constitute the traditional
domain of sociology and social psychology. Some of these concepts, social
capital is a prominent example, have little operational and empirical content.
This is the main reason why many economists are skeptical: as long as new
concepts are not sharply and operationally deﬁned, they are not useful for
analytical purposes, and as long as they are not empirically veriﬁable, they
add little to our knowledge (see Manski, 2000, for a more structured critique).
One may dislike this extreme positivist conception of the social sciences, but
4such skepticism has a strong argument. For this reason, several researchers
in new social economics are devoting a lot of eﬀort to the development of
suitable theoretical tools and empirical strategies. The next section deals
with the former, while a synthesis of the latter is put oﬀ till the end of the
paper.
3 Interactions-based models
The general premise of an economic theory of social interactions, is that
the economic and the sociological perspectives both capture something im-
portant about the way individuals behave. In a famous paper, Granovet-
ter (1985) argued against two extremes, namely the under- and the over-
socialized conceptions of individual behavior. Granovetter envisaged a solu-
tion to this dilemma in the so-called “embeddedness approach”, based on the
idea that people make purposeful choices, but the process of choice is em-
bedded into social relations, rather than being atomized. In the economist’s
jargon, this is tantamount to say that individual utility has a private and
a social component. Indeed, this is the main feature of the new generation
of interactions-based models of individual behavior. As such, they are re-
lated to the research program advocated, among others, by James Coleman
(1988 and 1990), namely taking the rational choice paradigm as a starting
point, and then introducing social structure into it. A convenient way to
absorb the realm of social interactions into an economic model, i.e. to give
operational content to the deﬁnition given in section 1, is to allow individual
preferences, constraints and expectations to inﬂuence each other within a
reference group (Manski, 2000). These concepts need no explanation, except
perhaps the notion of reference group, originated by social psychologist Her-
bert Hyman in 1942 (see Hyman, 1960). Hyman deﬁned a reference group
“a social framework for comparison” (p. 384). For our purposes, we can
deﬁne an individual’s reference group, with respect to some individual choice
ω ∈ Ω, as the set of agents with whom the individual interacts, in the sense
deﬁned above, when choosing ω. Therefore, if when choosing an element of Ω
individual i’s preferences, constraints, or expectations are inﬂuenced by the
preferences, constraints or expectations of individual j,t h e nj belongs to i’s
reference group. Following Manski (2000), I will refer mainly to the special
c a s ei nw h i c hs u c hi n ﬂuence is mediated by j’s choice, or expected choice.
This is not an excessive restriction, as long as j’s choice is determined by her
5preferences, constraints, and expectations. As a matter of terminology, it
i si m p o r t a n tt ok e e pi nm i n dt h a tM a n s k id e ﬁnes preferences over behaviors
rather than over outcomes. As a consequence, preferences are always endoge-
nous in interactive contexts. At the other extreme, if one deﬁnes preferences
over the set of outcomes, where each element is contingent to what others
are choosing, then preferences are never endogenous, rather incentives are.
The diﬀerence between a conventional and an interactions-based model,
can be represented as follows. The conventional economic model assumes
that agents have a principle of behavior in the optimization of an objective
function, u. Restricting to individuals, this function represents preferences
over the levels of some activity, ω, and is characterized by some individual
trait in the set of characteristics, X:
ui = u(ωi;Xi) (1)
where i =1 ,...,I indexes agents in the economy. Resources and market
parameters deﬁne the choice set, Ωi (Xi), whose content depends on the in-
dividual characteristics. For instance, in classical consumer theory ωi is a
consumption bundle, and income, yi, is the only characteristic in Xi that
inﬂuences the budget constraint. Rational individuals will obtain a level of
welfare given by their indirect utility function, v:
vi (p,y) ≡ max
ωi
u(ωi;Xi) s.t. ωi ∈ Ωi ≡ {ω : p · ω ≤ yi}
where p is a parametric price vector. Since in a competitive market, given
supply, prices are determined by the interaction of individual demands, in
this model individuals inﬂuence each other indirectly, through market prices.
This is an example of a pecuniary externality: one’s demand inﬂuences prices,
and so others’ welfare, which is a basic form of market interactions. In an
interactions-based model, in addition,a g e n t sm a yi n ﬂuence each other di-
rectly, because of social, or non-market, interactions. These are forms of
non-pecuniary externalities, associated with a “social” component of utility,
and can be represented as the direct inﬂuence of the sets of others’ choices,
ω−i, and characteristics, X−i,o ni’s behavior. Since this model tries to cap-
ture a sociological perspective, it assumes that individual i,w h e nc h o o s i n g
her behavior, is not inﬂuenced by the whole population, but by a subset of
individuals, i.e. her reference group, gi. The set of reference groups deﬁnes a
social structure. Each individual may have multiple reference groups, possi-
6bly one for each diﬀerent interpretation of ω.F o re a c hω, the reference group
may be exogenous (e.g. race, gender, and native language), or a matter of
choice, possibly on the market (e.g. residential neighborhood, school, and
social aﬃliations). Assuming that utility is separable (hence additive) in its
private and social components, utility function (1) is extended as follows:
ui = υ(ωi,X i,Y gi)+s(ωi,µ i (ω−i|gi,X−i,Y gi)) (2)
where µi (ω−i|gi,X−i,Y gi) is a subjective probability measure, a belief, over
t h ec h o i c e so ft h eo t h e ri n d i v i d u a l si nt h er e f e r e n c eg r o u p ,g i v e ng r o u pc o m -
position, gi, the set of characteristics of individuals other than i, X−i,a n dt h e
contextual characteristics of group gi, Ygi. This formulation should clarify the
key feature of interactions-based models, namely the synergy between private
motives, represented by individual utility υ(.),a n ds o c i a li n ﬂuences, repre-
sented by social utility s(.), in determining individual incentives (see Brock
and Durlauf, 2001a). Analogously, one’s alternatives may depend on others’
expected behavior: Ωi = Ω(Xi,µ i (ω−i|gi,X−i,Y gi)). Furthermore, when the
reference group is not exogenous, a second constraint must be added to the
model, namely gi ∈ Gi,w h e r eGi is the set of groups which are accessible






ω ∈ Ωi (Xi,µ i (ω−i|g,X−i,Y g))
Up to separability, this is a general model with social interactions eﬀects, in
which preferences, constraints and expectations are possibly interdependent,
and the social structure, if appropriate, is endogenously determined. In such
a setting, an equilibrium is deﬁned as a set of groups, and a probability
distribution over individual behaviors, such that utility is maximized for
each individual, and the market for memberships, if any, clears. The diﬀerent
social structures implicit in the two frameworks, (1) and (2), are represented
in ﬁgure 1. Notice that such representation implies that market interactions




Figure 1. In the traditional model (left) individuals interact through the Wal-
rasian auctioneer, A. In an interactions-based model (right) individuals also inter-
act directly within reference groups. An individual’s reference group is the set of
agents connected with the individual through an edge.
Three remarks about this framework are called for. First, the kind of
preferences represented by (2) are by no means a novelty in mainstream eco-
nomics. For instance, Arrow and Hahn (1971) studied an economy in which
utility depends on the entire allocation, e.g. preferences over goods depend on
others’ consumption, and showed that, under standard assumptions, a com-
petitive equilibrium exists when utility has a form like (2). Second, looking at
such interactive formulation of utility, one may wonder what is the diﬀerence
with a standard game-theoretic model. As a matter of fact, non-cooperative
game theory provides a tool for the analysis of any kind of interactions, being
an interactive decision theory. According to Blume and Durlauf (2002), so-
cial interactions models are merely coordination games, which are interesting
on their own because they oﬀer a convenient framework to think about multi-
ple social equilibria, and because of econometric implementability. However,
the overlapping between an interactions-based model like (2) and a game-
theoretic model is not perfect. The latter requires that the strategic structure
of the game be common knowledge among players. This is not necessarily
the case when the interactions are determined by particular sociological or
psychological forces: in this case agents may interact without fully realiz-
ing the pattern of reciprocal inﬂuence. This doesn’t mean that individuals
don’t know their preferences, rather that their preferences are shaped by the
social context in a way that may be beyond their perception. According
to this view, individuals learn their preferences in the same sense in which
they learn their native languages or tastes for particular cuisines, through
8a process which is not necessarily intentional (Bowles, 1998). In this case,
an individual is not necessarily interacting with others in the game theoretic
sense. That is to say, any strategic interaction is a non-market interaction,
but the converse is not true. For instance, Bowles (1998) emphasizes the
importance of “social interactions aﬀecting the diﬀusion of cultural traits in
ap o p u l a t i o nin ways often unrecognized by any of the participants” (Bowles,
1998, p. 81, emphasis mine). However, I think this is a peripheral discussion:
one can approximately regard interactions-based models as standard game
theoretic models, with special emphasis on the aggregate properties implied
by the structure of interaction. Indeed, the main equilibrium notion in this
literature is some version of Nash equilibrium. Finally, the synergy between
private and social utility captures the main explanations of behavior advo-
cated by economists and sociologists. Therefore, interactions-based models
can be regarded as an answer to Granovetter’s (1985) criticism of the over-
and under-socialized methodologies of traditional sociology and economics.
However, it must be noticed that methodological individualism is not super-
seded: in a framework like (2), social interactions aﬀect individual behavior,
yet the latter is the unit of analysis. Such framework enlarges the set of ex-
planatory variables for individual behavior, and so it extends the traditional
neoclassical model, without relaxing any of the neoclassical assumptions.
The speciﬁcation of social utility s(.), i.e. the description of the way
ω−i and X−i enter the model, determines the kind of social interactions at
work within the group. For instance, a popular speciﬁcation of (2) is the
model with conformity eﬀects, where the social eﬀect stems from the desire
to minimize a function of the distance between own behavior and neighbors’
behavior:












j is i’s subjective expectation of j’s behavior, as derived from the
subjective probability measure µi,a n dJij is the strength of interaction be-
tween individuals i and j. The latter can be interpreted as the entry of a
social distance, or adjacency, matrix. Think of the pattern of interactions in
the population as a nondirected graph, i.e. a collection of nodes, represent-
ing the I individuals, and arcs connecting the nodes, representing social ties
among them. Each arc has a value, Jij, which represents a measure of social
distance. Such values are stacked into the adjacency matrix {Jij},w h e r e
9Jij 6=0if j ∈ gi
Jij =0otherwise
Therefore, i’s reference group can also be expressed in set notation: gi =
{j ∈ I : Jij 6=0 }. Of course the “interactions matrix” {Jij} varies with the
kind of behavior, ω, under study. Ioannides (2003) interprets {Jij} as a
topology of social interactions, and discusses the implications of alternative
topologies for interactions-based models. Notice that in the conformity model
(3), assuming Jij > 0 ∀i,j, individuals suﬀer a loss, i.e. are punished, when
deviating from the expected behavior of other individuals in their reference
group. The ﬁrst function on the right hand side of (3) is private utility, i.e.
the private value of choosing ωi in group g, and the second is social utility,
i.e. the disutility of not conforming. Therefore, this model allows the han-
dling of sociological phenomena within traditional economic analysis, such as
social norms, Veblen’s emulative consumption, “keeping up with the Jone-
ses”, peer-group, and role models. Such eﬀects can be interpreted in terms of
strategic complementarities, whereby the marginal utility of increasing one’s
action increases with the level of action chosen by other agents (see Cooper
and John, 1988). A stochastic version of this model, with the remarkable
advantage of direct econometric implementability, has been developed by
Brock and Durlauf (2001a,b and 2003). They assume that individuals are
inﬂuenced by mean behavior in the group with uniform social distance, and
add a behavior-speciﬁc i.i.d. random term to individual utility. As a con-
sequence, the equilibrium probability of a certain social social conﬁguration,
ω =( ω1,...,ωI), is a likelihood function, and the model parameters, in prin-
ciple, can be estimated using for instance a logistic regression (see Brock and
Durlauf, 2001b for a discussion of identiﬁcation conditions). The Brock and
Durlauf model has been imported into economics from statistical physics.
The aforementioned work of Föllmer (1974) is important because it was the
ﬁrst to use a statistical mechanics approach in economics, as a way to model
social interdependence. The idea is that people in a social system interact in
the same sense as particles do in a physical system. Of course the fundamen-
tal diﬀerence is that interaction is governed by physical laws in one case, and
by economic, sociological and psychological laws in the other. This approach
has turned out to be very useful for modeling purposes, and especially for
econometrics: it exploits the strict similarities between statistical mechanics
10models and random utility models, whic h ,a sw e l lk n o w n ,f o r mt h eb a s i so f
an important branch of microeconometrics (Durlauf, 1997).
A simple model like (3) produces several interesting results, which are
usually associated with complex systems, such as multiple equilibria, non-
ergodicity, and phase transitions (or threshold eﬀects). Such properties, as
emerging in interactions-based models, are described by Durlauf (2003a,b).
Intuitively, multiple equilibria emerge because when the private utility of a
certain behavior is small enough with respect to social utility, the incentive
to behave like others is stronger than the incentive to choose any particu-
lar alternative. For instance, suppose that, in a certain community, kids’
expected return to education (private utility) is positive but low, and that
social approval from friends requires one not to be too far from the mean
level of education in one’s clique (social utility). One can show that when
the social pressure to conform dwarfs the perceived private returns to edu-
cation, there exist two stable Pareto-rankable equilibria, one associated with
high average education and one associated with low average education, even
if the intrinsic value of education is positive. Since the second equilibrium
is stable and ineﬃcient, it can be interpreted as a poverty, or “social”, trap.
Therefore, interactions-based models oﬀer a convenient framework to think
about poverty traps as determined by social interactions rather than mar-
ket imperfections or individual incentives only. Such multiplicity is easy to
visualize, as shown in ﬁgure 2, since interactions-based models are naturally




Figure 2. Unique and multiple equilibria.
11In ﬁgure 2, two diﬀerent response functions are drawn. The s-shape re-
quires some kind of nonlinearity in the model, which is easily obtainable,
for instance, by introducing stochastic structure. The dashed function corre-
sponds to a case in which private utility is large relative social utility, and so
the behavioral equilibrium is unique. The solid function corresponds to the
opposite case, and multiple equilibria appear. The passage from a state of
multiplicity to one of uniqueness, and vice versa, occurs at a critical thresh-
old related to the ratio between private and social utility. In analogy with
physical models, such passage is sometimes referred to as a “phase transi-
tion”, since the qualitative properties of the system change. The threshold
eﬀect follows: the incentive to behave similarly prevails until private util-
ity becomes large enough to reward a non conformist behavior more than
social utility punishes it. That point is the watershed between unique and
multiple equilibria. For this reason it is often referred to as tipping point,
since when the system is in the neighborhood of that point, a “tip” (e.g. a
small change in the parameters) may result in an abrupt change of its qual-
itative properties, and of the equilibrium. This idea, originated in biology
and fruitfully used in political sciences, is receiving increasing attention in
economics (see Lustick and Miodownik, 2004, for an historical account, and
Brock, 2003, for a mathematical illustration). Finally, when multiple equilib-
ria exist, and provided that the model has a stochastic structure, ergodicity
breaks down because of the path-dependency aspect of equilibrium: once a
group is trapped into a particular state, only a coordinated change in behav-
ior can move the system to a diﬀerent, possibly Pareto-superior, equilibrium.
Alternatively, as an example of policy implication, if a group is stuck into the
ineﬃcient equilibrium, then a subsidy that increases private utility beyond
the critical threshold of multiple equilibria will lead the system directly into
the desirable equilibrium, as shown in ﬁgure 2. Other interesting properties
of interactions-based models, from the point of view of the social sciences,
are (i) the existence of a social multiplier of behaviors, and (ii) the tendency
toward equilibrium stratiﬁcation in the social space.
12(i) The social multiplier
The social multiplier of behavior is a matter of the relation between the
aggregate response and the sum of independent individual responses after a
common shock. It works like the Keynesian multiplier of expenditure; indeed
they have the same analytical expressions. The idea is that a common shock
across agents has a direct eﬀect on individual behavior through private utility,
and a cumulative indirect eﬀect through social utility. As a consequence, the
ﬁnal aggregate response to the shock exceeds the sum of the initial individual
responses, while the two are equal when agents don’t interact. The social
multiplier can be deﬁned as the ratio between the former and the latter. The
simplest way to derive it is to consider another popular speciﬁcation of (2),
i.e. the model with uniform (i.e. with Jij = J ∀i,j) proportional spillovers:










where xi ∈ Xi is the only relevant individual characteristic. Individual be-
havior has a net private beneﬁt, given by the diﬀerence between the ﬁrst two
terms on the right hand side, which is private utility. Individuals also receive
a spillover from average group behavior, proportional to the level of their







I . Also, normalize J so that 0 6 J<1.F r o mt h eﬁrst
order necessary condition, we can recover the optimal individual behavior as





















Imagine that a common shock hits the individuals in the group. The indi-




=1 ,( 7 )












The ratio between the latter and the former, i.e. 1/(1 − J) > 1,i st h e
social multiplier: the aggregate response exceeds the sum of the individual
responses, because of strategic complementarities across the members of the
group. The social multiplier has a key theoretical and empirical implication:
when the magnitude of interactions is large, a small change in the individual
fundamentals, xi in this case, can produce a large aggregate response. There-
fore, this model seems particularly apt to explain aggregate shifts across time
and space that seem unrelated to fundamentals.
(ii) Stratiﬁcation in the social space.
In presence of spillover eﬀects individuals are not indiﬀerent, other things
being equal, between diﬀerent locations in the social space. In particular,
rational individuals will choose, if possible, the group that maximizes their
expected beneﬁt with respect to membership. For instance, if parents be-
lieve that the performance of their kids is inﬂuenced by the performance of
their classmates, they are not indiﬀerent between diﬀerent schools in a city.
This implies a tendency toward stratiﬁcation along individual characteristics,
for instance income, or human capital. The traditional approach to spatial
stratiﬁcation, uses the same single crossing condition that produces separat-
ing equilibria in signaling models. Assume that memberships are costly, and
consider, again, a model with proportional spillovers, where private utility is
aﬀected, perhaps through budget constraint, by membership price, ρg,
ui = u
¡
ωi,x i,Y g,ρ g
¢
+ Jωgωi,( 9 )
where ωg ≡ 1
I
P
j E (ωj) is mean behavior in the reference group. Suppose
that the relevant individual type is x ∈ Xi,a n dt h a tYg contains only group
characteristics that are independent of the sorting process. Then there is a
tendency to spatial stratiﬁcation along x if the marginal rate of substitution











> 0.( 1 0 )
This condition says that the willingness to pay for the spillover associated
14with social interactions increases with one’s type. A possible objection is
that this approach to stratiﬁcation relies too much on preferences. It is
possible to introduce a memberships market, e.g. a housing market, and show
that the equilibrium prices contain a social premium, because individuals
value positive spillovers (e.g. Bénabou, 1996). If the social premium is
large enough, some individuals will be pushed beyond the boundary of their
budget constraint. In this case, if income and the relevant type are correlated,
stratiﬁcation will occur because of constraints too, rather than preferences
only.
There are two main questions to be addressed in the interactions-based
framework, namely (a) what is the source of interdependence between indi-
viduals, i.e. why should we plug into the utility function objects like ω−i and
X−i,a n d( b) how the social context, i.e. group composition, is determined
in the presence of endogenous interactions, i.e. of simultaneous inﬂuences
across agents. As it will be clear, these questions can be better tackled after
taking a look at possible applications of interactions-based models. There-
fore, the next section reviews some applications, and sections 5 and 6 tackle
the two questions above.
4E c o n o m i c A p p l i c a t i o n s
This section illustrates some applications of the interactions-based framework
to strictly economic problems, and in which interdependence is driven by so-
ciological and psychological forces. This choice cuts out important applica-
tions, such as technological interactions, which lie at the core of endogenous
growth theories, crime and other social pathologies, evolution of science and
language, behavior of political parties, and national security. A synthetic
descriptions of such applications is provided by Brock and Durlauf (2001b),
and Blume and Durlauf (2001). It also cuts out the related literature on the
economics of network industries (Katz and Shapiro, 1985, and Shy, 2001),
which is based on technological complementarities in the form of network ef-
fects, the new economic geography (Krugman, 1991 and 1996), which builds
upon the idea of agglomeration economies, and trade networks (Kranton and
Minehart, 2001), which focuses on strategic trade agreements in presence of
spillovers from previous agreements. I have selected six applications: match-
ing through social networks, welfare participation, memberships theory of
15poverty and inequality, herd behavior in ﬁnancial markets, and consumer
behavior. Constraints, preferences, or expectations interactions, or a combi-
nation of the three, are present in all the applications I have mentioned.
4.1 Allocation of jobs
In a seminal paper, Rees (1966) tried to explain evidence showing that refer-
rals by present employees, hence social networks, often outperformed mar-
kets, e.g. employment agencies, in the allocation of jobs. Rees’ explanation,
inspired by Stigler’s (1962) pioneering work in search theory, anticipated one
of the fundamental topics in the economics of information: the key to the
comparative advantage of social networks is an information asymmetry that
characterizes labor markets. Rees deﬁned two aspects of search: the inten-
sive margin is characterized by collection of additional information about an
individual, while the extensive margin is characterized by additional search
of potential employees. When quality of labor is unobservable, and there is
enough variation in it, from the employer’s viewpoint the intensive margin of
search is more important than the extensive margin. The reason is that when
ability is suﬃciently dispersed, the expected net gain from inferring the posi-
tion of an individual in the distribution of ability is higher that the expected
net gain from an additional draw. In this case, social networks outperform
markets in terms of transaction costs, provided that employees tend to refer
people with whom they interact, i.e. people similar to themselves, under the
pressure of a reputation eﬀect. This gives employers who are satisﬁed with
their current employees a cheap screening device when hiring new workers.
This theory was corroborated by Granovetter’s (1974) [1995] study of how
people ﬁnd a job. According to his survey data, roughly 50% of jobs are
allocated through social networks. This suggests that one’s success in the
labor market may depend on social interactions, a possibility with obvious
implications for the distribution of opportunities across distinct groups in
a society. Such phenomenon can be easily modeled using the few concepts
introduced in section 3. Redeﬁne social distance, Jij, as the probability that
individual i is successfully referred by j, and rename it pij.O fc o u r s epij > 0
only if j ∈ gi. Given the nature of the problem, such probability depends
on j’s labor supply, 1 − lj,w h e r el is leisure: for instance, an unemployed
individual cannot refer other individuals. It also depends on j’s character-
istics: for instance, a high skilled worker can be a more persuasive referee.




pij (lj,X j) (11)
and her expected wage is E (w)=φ(pi),w h e r eφ is a non decreasing func-
tion. Therefore, deﬁning utility over leisure and consumption, the individual
objective function is:
ui = u(li,(1 − li)φ(pi (l−i,X−i))),( 1 2 )
which has the same structure as model (2). This research area regained
attention in economics with the work of Montgomery (1991). One of his
ﬁndings is that stronger interactions (measured by network density), and
more ability-stratiﬁed societies (measured by inbreeding bias) cause more
wage dispersion. This ﬁnding is reminiscent of the adverse selection situa-
tion. Indeed the underlying mechanism is the same: workers who end up
u s i n gt h ef o r m a lc h a n n e la r es u b j e c tt oa“ l e m o ne ﬀect” and receive low ex-
pected wages relative to workers relying on social networks. Montgomery’s
simple and insightful model has been complicated in several ways by Calvo-
Armengol and Jackson (2003), who use a stochastic setting to generate addi-
tional interesting results, such as duration dependence in unemployment, and
dependence of labor force participation on social interactions, via informa-
tion spillovers. Notice that when social networks are geographically deﬁned,
the hypothesis that they aﬀect labor market outcomes implies spatial clus-
tering of unemployment. Interesting empirical tests of this implication are
provided by Topa (2001) and Conley and Topa (2002). These authors use
spatial econometric techniques to estimate signiﬁcant local spillovers, inter-
preted as social interactions eﬀects, under diﬀerent deﬁnitions of the social
space. These developments suggest a possible way to enrich the microfounda-
tions of the theories of unemployment and labor force participation. In such
theoretical models, though, the social context is exogenous. This means that
people are not allowed to form ties strategically, in order to reap the beneﬁts
of information spillovers. A natural extension of these models would be to
allow for this possibility. An example, is provided in the review by Ioannides
and Loury (2003).
174.2 Welfare dependency
Evidence, in the USA, shows that people applying for welfare beneﬁts are less
than those who are eligible. Early work by Moﬃtt (1983), building on previ-
ous sociological work, showed that such anomaly can be explained in terms of
the stigma associated with welfare dependence. Extending this work, Lind-
beck et al. (1999) conjecture that stigma stems from the presence of a social
norm prescribing that one must live on the proﬁts of his own work. However,
the intensity of such norm is determined, endogenously, by the fraction of
people who live on welfare rather than, as Moﬃtt assumed, by the level of
welfare beneﬁts. In terms of a speciﬁcation like (4), presence of the social
norm means J>0, and intensity is determined by average behavior. Specif-
ically, Lindbeck et al. (1999) work with a binary choice model, where ω =1
means work, and live on after-tax wage, (1 − t)W,a n dω = −1 means do not
work, and live on government transfer, T. These options determine private
utility, υ(.). However, living on welfare implies stigma, which has a disutility
cost. If ωig ∈ [−1,1] is i’s subjective expectation of mean behavior in group
g, then the expected fraction of people living on welfare is wig = 1
2 (ωig +1 ) .
Social utility, s(wig), is a function of such fraction, with s0 (wig) 6 0,s ot h a t
the disutility of stigma, i.e. the embarrassment of living on the proﬁts of
others’ work, decreases as more people live on welfare. Assuming that pop-
ulation is a continuum with measure 1, such preferences are represented by




2 (1 + ωi)(1− t)W + 1
2 (1 − ωi)T
¤
− 1
2 (1 − ωi)s(wig) (13)
The choice between labor and welfare depends on the relation between ui (1)
and ui (−1). Under mild assumptions, there exists a unique critical wage
level W∗ such that ui (1) = ui (−1). So, assuming that wage is a random
variable distributed according to the probability function F (.),a n dc l o s i n g
the model through rational expectations, i.e. wig = E (wg)=1
2 (E (ωi)+1 ) ,






−1 (υ(T) − s(E (wg)))
¤
,( 1 4 )
which is a ﬁxed point equation. Depending on the speciﬁcation of F (.),i tc a n
generate a diagram similar to ﬁgure 2. This means that when a social norm
against living on welfare exists, and its intensity in endogenously determined
18by the participation rate, there may exist two stable equilibria, one with
a high, and one with a low welfare dependency rate. This holds for given
wage distribution, and for given level of taxation. On the contrary, one can
check that if there is no such social norm, i.e. s(wig)=0 , then the right
hand side of (14) is a constant, and there is a unique equilibrium dependency
rate. Of course, a unique equilibrium is also possible if private utility dwarfs
social utility. As Lindbeck et al. (1999) suggest, an important extension
of this model is to account explicitly for the role of endogenous reference
groups. The hypothesis that social interactions aﬀect welfare participation
and labor supply has been tested empirically by Bertrand et al. (2000),
who assume that one’s reference group, with respect to welfare choices, is
approximated by language spoken at home. They ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect of
social interactions on welfare participation, although this does not provide
information on whether the reference group matters because of stigma, social
learning, information spillovers or other possible mechanisms. I will return
on this “identiﬁcation problem” in section 5.
4.3 Persistent poverty
The possible eﬀect of social interactions on the probability of being successful
in the labor market is an example of how the social situation aﬀects ultimate
economic success. Economics has traditionally explained poverty focusing
mainly on individual and family characteristics, or on market imperfections.
An alternative perspective focusing on social interactions is related to im-
portant works in political sciences, such as Wilson (1987) and Jargowsky
(1997), and has recently been elaborated by Durlauf (2001) into a “mem-
berships theory of poverty”. Such a theory emphasizes the role of group
inﬂuences in determining economic success.
Suppose that an individual is a member of an ethnic group that
suﬀers from discrimination, grows up in a poor community whose
role models and peer groups militate against economic success,
and subsequently ﬁnds himself in a series of poor schools and
jobs. This sequence constitutes an explanation of why such an
individual is in poverty (Durlauf, 2001, p. 394).
The reason why this sequence constitutes an explanation is clear if indi-
vidual behavior is governed by an interactions-based model like (2) rather
19than the traditional model (1). Such memberships theory has important pol-
icy implications. For instance, it is suggestive of the eﬀectiveness of group-
based more than individual-based interventions, according to the principle
of the social multiplier. It also sheds new light on the theory of poverty
traps, as discussed in section 3. De Bartolome (1990), Benabou (1996), and
Durlauf (1996a,b) showed how the presence of neighborhood eﬀects at the
level of human capital production function may generate stratiﬁcation, which
is a necessary condition in a memberships theory of persistent poverty.
4.4 Investor behavior
Among the regularities observed in ﬁnancial markets, three are puzzling with
respect to the eﬃcient markets theory, namely excess volatility of prices
and returns, fat tails of the distribution of returns, and abrupt changes of
the kind associated with market crashes. Research programs as diverse as
econophysics (see Mantegna and Stanley, 2000) and behavioral ﬁnance (see
Shleifer, 2000) have developed in the attempt to explain such puzzles. While
the former, so far, lacks a complete theory of individual behavior (Durlauf,
2003a), the latter seems to rely too much on the existence of irrational agents
on the market (Barberis and Thaler, 2002). Indeed, it is possible to explain
such anomalies using microeconomic models of rational, but interdependent,
decision making, such as an interactions-based model. Provided that agents
have diﬀerent information, it is fully rational to try to anticipate and imitate
the behavior of others. Thus, herd behavior, and the associated contagion
process, are rational when others’ choices are believed to convey informa-
tion about the fundamentals (Banerjee 1992, Bickhchandani et al. 1998,
Morris 2000), or simply about where the market is going (think of the Key-
nesian “beauty contest” parable). Notice that a model like (3), where agents
are punished when deviating from the group average, is consistent at least
with abrupt changes in investor behavior. This can be seen considering the
stochastic binary (buy and sell) version of the model, of the kind used by
Brock and Durlauf (2001a): abrupt changes can be explained by small shocks
to individual private utility (Brock, 1997 and 2003). The latter can either
bring about a phase transition, with appearance of multiple equilibria if the
system is in the proximity of the tipping point, or simply shift the equilib-
rium from one point to the other due to the eﬀect of the social multiplier. In
either case, the two stable equilibria depicted in ﬁgure 1 correspond to mar-
ket exuberance and market depression, and the shift from one equilibrium to
20the other corresponds to an episodic market crash or market boom.
4.5 Consumer behavior
Many years ago, James Duesenberry (1948) elaborated a theory of consumer
behavior, based on the idea of relative consumption. Duesenberry questioned
one of the fundamental assumptions of consumer theory, namely that con-
sumers behave independently of each other. His argument was that there
is no empirical basis for such an assumption, and that indeed consumption
patterns seem to have a social character. Such social character is associated
with a demonstration eﬀect:
People believe that the consumption of high quality goods for
any purpose is desirable and important. If they habitually use
one set of goods, they can be made dissatisﬁed with them by a
demonstration of the superiority of others. But mere knowledge
of the existence of superior goods is not a very eﬀective habit
breaker. Frequent contact with them may be [...]. What kind of
reaction is produced by looking at a friend’s new car or looking
at houses or apartments better than one’s own? The response
is likely to be a feeling of dissatisfaction with one’s own house
or car. If this feeling is produced often enough it will lead to
action which eliminates it, that is, to an increase in expenditure
(Duesenberry, 1948, p. 27).
This theory can be formalized as follows. In order to simplify the exposi-
tion, assume that quality is measured by the absolute level of consumption.
It follows that in presence of a demonstration eﬀect an individual’s utility
depends on own consumption, Ci, and consumption of other people, C−i,i n
i’s reference group, gi:
Ui = U (Ci,C−i),( 1 5 )
Let’s measure the social distance between i and j, Jij, with the frequency of
contacts that generate the demonstration eﬀect. The latter can be expressed
by the ratio Ci/Cj,j∈ gi, weighted by the frequency of contacts. Therefore,
a possible speciﬁcation of (15) is:










.( 1 6 )
Using lower cases for logs, we can use the transformation
ui = ci +
P
j∈gi
Jij (ci − cj), (17)
which has the structure of model (3), with the diﬀerence that now individuals
have an incentive to consume more than others, when possible. Duesenberry’s
hypothesis has been developed by Binder and Pesaran (2001) into a model
of consumption in a life-cycle economy under various forms of social interac-
tions. Bowles and Park (2003) show that a model like (17) has interesting
implications for labor supply, namely the latter increases with the degree of
income inequality in a society. They interpret this ﬁnding as a Veblen eﬀect,
i.e. the desire to emulate the consumption patterns of the rich. In this case
t h er i c hc o n s t i t u t et h er e f e r e n c eg r o u po ft h el e s sw e l l - o ﬀ.T h e y a l s o s h o w
that this hypothesis is supported by robust empirical evidence.
5 Sources of interdependence
What are the underlying mechanisms generating social interdependence of
the kind illustrated so far? As remarked by Samuelson (2004), one cannot
be satisﬁed with the radical shortcut of writing others’ behavior and charac-
teristics into the utility function in order to explain behavioral anomalies of
the kind generated by social interdependence. There exist at least two im-
portant “identiﬁcation problems” when a researcher observes that individual
behaviors are correlated within a group. First, as elucidated by Manski
(1993), individuals in a group may behave similarly because (a)t h e yh a v e
similar characteristics (correlated eﬀect), (b)t h e ya r ea ﬀected by the same
contextual variables (exogenous social eﬀect), and (c) because they directly
inﬂuence each other. The latter, referred to as the endogenous social eﬀect,
is present when J 6=0 . Second, even if one can isolate the endogenous social
eﬀect, and the associated social multiplier, a question is still there, namely
why J 6=0 . Therefore, one needs a theory that explains a formulation like
(2). Glaeser and Scheinkman (2001) discuss four possibilities, for positive
interactions eﬀects: (i) pure physical externalities (ii) social learning, (iii)
22stigma, and (iv) direct preferences for imitation. However, if we exclude (i),
these are epiphenomena rather than proper causes of social interactions. I
will focus on two general mechanisms generating direct interactions between
preferences, constraints, and expectations: uncertainty and the associated
transaction costs, and the psychology of social life. The ﬁrst lies within the
traditional domain of economics, while the second lies beyond it. I leave out
technological mechanisms, which already receive a great deal of attention in
economics (see Shy, 2001).
5.1 Uncertainty and transaction costs
A logical reason why non-market interactions matter is that markets do not
solve all aspects of the coordination problem. In this sense, for instance,
Arrow (1971) maintains that social norms, which ﬁtam o d e ll i k e( 3 ) ,a r ea
reaction of society to market failures. On the other hand, social interactions
are themselves costly, since they require, for instance, maintenance of a social
network. Therefore, we observe a mix of market and non-market interactions
when both are costly: markets economize on non-market interactions, but
the converse is also true. Think of the matching application described above:
an anonymous and perfect labor market allocates jobs eﬃciently, and econ-
omizes on the need to have the right “connections” in order to get a job,
other things being equal. But because of the transactions costs generated
by information asymmetries, the labor market is far from ideal. As a con-
sequence, social networks come to play an important role in the allocation
of resources, beside the very market mechanism. Transaction costs are usu-
ally due to uncertainty, and so the latter is a reason why people are aﬀected
directly by others’ behavior. If any relevant variable were perfectly observ-
able, and if any possible future contingency were foreseeable and writable
in costless enforceable contracts, i.e. if markets were for free, people would
economize on costly non-market interactions. Social learning is an instance
of a social eﬀect due to uncertainty. An interesting approach to the economic
consequences of social interactions based on incomplete contracts has been
developed by Bowles (2004). Summarizing: social eﬀects in a market econ-
omy may be due to the transaction costs generated by the combination of
uncertainty and incomplete contracts. However, since social interactions are
themselves costly, there must be an optimal mix of market and non-market
interactions in a market economy.
235.2 Psychology of social life
In many instances, social eﬀects arise because of the mere psychology of so-
cial life, which constitutes the proper domain of social psychology. This is
the case, for instance, when one is sensitive to other’s behavior because of
feelings of envy, considerations of status, concern for social comparison, or
existence of social norms of behavior with associated stigma or other forms
of punishment. Sometimes it is possible to explain such feelings in terms
of standard economic mechanisms, possibly driven by evolutionary forces.
For instance, Samuelson (2004) has explained the existence of relative con-
sumption eﬀects in evolutionary terms, whereby individuals who imitate the
consumption of people around them are making optimal use of information
in uncertain environments. Therefore, it is possible that evolution optimally
generates utility functions like (17). But this instance should fall under the
heading of the previous subsection, and so the two causes of social eﬀects I
am considering are not independent in an evolutionary perspective. However,
i ti sn o ta l w a y ss o ,i . e .i ti sn o ta l w a y st h ec a s et h a t ,f o ri n s t a n c e ,t h ec o n c e r n
for relative positions solves an economic problem stemming from uncertainty
or transaction costs. Therefore, one has to concede something to the inter-
action between human nature and social organization. This should persuade
of the importance of an interdisciplinary approach, and of the need to look
towards neighboring social, human, and biological sciences. Another aspect,
one that is receiving considerable attention in economics, concerns the role of
identity in determining individual behavior (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000, and
2002). Identity, deﬁned as the self-image category one inherits or chooses,
w o r k sl i k ear e f e r e n c eg r o u p :p e o p l et e n dt ob e h a v ea so t h e r si nt h es a m e
identity group, in order to reduce a possible cognitive/identity dissonance,
although identity too can matter for purely economic reasons, as an infer-
ential device (see Keely and Tan, 2004, and, more generally, Manski, 2004).
These examples, and indeed many of the ideas discussed so far, suggest that
the social interactions approach is closely related to behavioral economics: it
is striking that, so far, these two research areas developed apart.
One of the problems that arise in empirical work is how to distinguish
between these diﬀerent mechanisms. Indeed, identiﬁcation of the interactions
parameter, J, doesn’t reveal the source of social interactions. It is a prob-
lem since diﬀerent sources have diﬀerent policy implications. For instance,
suppose that we have estimated positive correlations between individual con-
24sumption and group consumption, after controlling for individual and group
characteristics. An individual who imitates his neighbors’ consumption pat-
tern, does so because of relative consumption eﬀects or because of social
learning? In the ﬁrst case preferences are literally endogenous (a change
others’ consumption induces a change in i’s preference ordering among the
elements of the consumption set), but not in the second (a change in oth-
ers’ consumption induces a change in i’s choice through social learning of
the true state of the world). Both cases are consistent with J>0, a case
of observational equivalence. However, rather than weakening the research
program, this problem is an incentive to reﬁne the theory and to sharpen the
econometric tools.
6M e m b e r s h i p s
Even if we were able to tell why social eﬀects matter, it is far from clear
who inﬂuences whom, and how two individuals become members of each
other’s reference group. A theory of social interactions needs to answer such
questions, for both theoretical and empirical reasons. From a theoretical
point of view, we need an explanation of why people are possibly subject
to social inﬂu e n c ew i t h i nag r o u pw h e nt h e yc a na v o i ds u c hi n ﬂuence mov-
ing to another group. This issue is related to Tiebout’s (1956) model of
community formation. Indeed, models with exogenous neighborhood eﬀects
and endogenous sorting (such as De Bartolome 1990, Benabou 1996, and
Durlauf 1996a,b) are examples of Tiebout models where people consider ﬁs-
cal policy as well as social eﬀects when choosing a community. The issue
here is slightly more complicated, since I am focusing on endogenous social
eﬀects. When memberships are a matter of choice, rational individuals will
take into account interdependencies if they perceive them. In this case, the
maximization problem following model (2), can be thought of as occurring
in two stages: at the ﬁrst stage individuals choose their group, and at the
second stage their behavior. Proceeding backward, at the ﬁrst stage individ-
uals know that the second stage payoﬀ will be the maximum, with respect
to their behavior, expected utility, with respect to the distribution of others’
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25Therefore, the reference group, if subject to choice, will be chosen at the ﬁrst






s.t. g ∈ Gi (19)
This is a quite mechanical way of conceiving group formation. We know that
memberships, even when are not exogenous, are often not determined by such
a purposeful behavior. When making friends with somebody, for instance,
it is unlikely that people are reckoning all the possible costs and beneﬁts of
friendship. People attract each other in many ways, and in the majority of
cases they come to interact in ways that are outside the conceptualizations
of economics. Therefore, this question too is, at least in part, outside the
traditional domain of economics, and suggests the insuﬃciency of a strict
economic approach to social interactions. On the other hand, the economics
approach cannot be neglected, since it has a strong rationale. Think, again,
of the application to labor market matching. If certain networks help in get-
ting a job, people have an incentive to become part of those networks, i.e.
to build links. Or think of the memberships theory of poverty. If parents
believe that particular interactions have negative inﬂuences on oﬀspring’s
economic success, they will avoid the corresponding memberships. To be
clear, this does not imply that observed memberships reﬂect a strategic pur-
pose. Nonetheless, it would be misleading to think that people don’t select
their, or their oﬀsprings’, peers.
There exists a related stream of game theoretic literature on network for-
mation, reviewed by Jackson (2003). The issue of group formation found a
fertile ground in cooperative game theory, in the context of research on coali-
tion formation. Aumann and Myerson (1988) discuss such issue, modeling
coalitions as sets of nodes and arcs, and the process of group formation as a
sequential game in which players establish links, i.e. acquire memberships,
considering future payoﬀs of the cooperative game. The key idea is a straight-
forward one: if groups are a source of beneﬁts for members, agents will try
to join the groups which maximize their beneﬁt, as expressed by model (19)
above. This approach has evolved into models of equilibrium networks: the
key idea is that players establish costly links and enjoy the beneﬁts of their
connections. This approach oﬀers several insights, and is an important step
for a full ﬂedged interactions-based framework, in which behavior and the
social context that inﬂuences it are both object of choice.
From an empirical point of view, modeling sorting when studying social
26inﬂuences is important because spatial correlation of individual behaviors or
individual outcomes, may be due to the fact that individuals who are similar
in some respect tend to be members of the same groups. If one does not pay
attention to the sorting process when people can choose their memberships,
estimates of the social eﬀects may be very misleading, because of selection-
bias. To overcome this problem, one can use experimental settings with ran-
dom memberships. In either case, assumptions are needed on who inﬂuences
whom. Empirical work, so far, has relied on approximations of reference
groups based on geographic proximity, or broad categories such as language
spoken at home and ethnicity, and has focused mainly on inﬂuences occur-
ring within classrooms or small residential neighborhoods. Such choices are
driven by data availability, and by the appeal of “natural” reference groups.
But what if one lives in neighborhood A, goes to school in neighborhood B,
and attends some group (e.g. a scout group) made up mainly of people from
neighborhood C? A promising perspective, suggested by Brock and Durlauf
(2004), is to use a model uncertainty framework (Brock, Durlauf and West,
2003) when evaluating policies whose eﬀects are potentially aﬀected by the
presence of social eﬀects. This would allow to overcome the problems stem-
ming from our ignorance about actual reference groups, and to robustify the
model with respect to the relevant reference group for the particular behavior
under study. Using Brock, Durlauf and West’s (2003) framework, suppose
the policy maker can observe individual and group characteristics, Xi and
Yg, in the population. Also assume that the eﬀect of a certain policy, p,
summarized into a loss function, L(.), depends on the magnitude of social
interactions between the members of group g, Jg. However, the policy maker
is uncertain about the boundaries of g, i.e. about what the actual reference
group is. The objective is to minimize, with respect to p, the expected loss,
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where G is the set of all plausible deﬁnitions of g from the policymaker
viewpoint.
7 Empirical approaches
How can the social eﬀects discussed so far be detected empirically? Three
main empirical routes have been followed. A ﬁrst, traditional, route consists
of using microdata. More recent approaches use either few macrodata or
either randomized or natural experiments. Brock and Durlauf (2001b) and
Durlauf (2003b) discuss such approaches at length. I will provide a summary
here for the sake of completeness. The traditional route uses microdata to
estimate directly the eﬀect of group behavior on individual behavior, ωi,a f t e r
controlling for individual characteristics, Xi, and group characteristics, Yg.
The baseline model is a linear one, and describes the continuous behavior of
an individual, ωi, drawn from a certain group, g. For instance, the following
is known as the linear-in-means model, since group expected mean behavior,
ωg, enters linearly:
ωi = a + cXi + dYg + Jωg + εi (22)
It well known that this route suﬀers from two major econometric problems.
The ﬁrst is a classical identiﬁcation problem. Notice that expected mean
behavior in i’s group, ωg, is endogenous by deﬁnition. Closing the model
through rational expectations, under the assumption that the contextual
vector Yg is independent of the error term, we obtain:
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28It is clear that when mean individual characteristics in the group, E (Xi|Ygi),
is a linear function of Ygi, the number of reduced form parameters that can
be identiﬁed is smaller than the number of parameters we need to estimate,
i.e. (a,c,d,J). In particular the main parameter of interest, J,i sn o ti d e n -
tiﬁed. However, this problem can be overcome: Brock and Durlauf (2001a,
2001b, 2004) discuss identiﬁcation conditions in parametric and non para-
metric settings, and suggest nonlinear techniques which overcome altogether
the multicollinearity problem of the baseline linear model. Indeed, there is
evidence that social eﬀects are nonlinear (see Ioannides, 2002). The second
problem is selection bias. If individuals choose their groups, their member-
ship in group g is not random, and so the observations from group g to be
used in estimating (22) do not constitute a random sample (see Brock and
Durlauf, 2001b, and Moﬃtt, 2001). This is the inferential problem studied by
Heckman (1979). Such problem can be overcome too: Ioannides and Zabel
(2002) have shown how to integrate choice of group and choice of behavior
subject to intra-group social eﬀects. In general, modeling sorting in presence
of social eﬀects allows to perform a selection bias corrected regression. There-
fore, a traditional model like (22) can be used after taking the proper steps.
However, reliable and detailed datasets linking individual to group-variables
are hard to ﬁnd.
The second route consists of estimating indirectly the social eﬀect, exploit-
ing few macrodata, namely the estimates of the variance-covariance structure
of individual behaviors. The rationale of this methodology, which economizes
on data, is elucidated by Glaeser and Scheinkman (2002). The key idea is
that, by their very nature, social interactions produce high variance across
time and space, not necessarily because of multiple equilibria. To see how
this strategy works, imagine that individual behavior is correctly described
by a model like (22). Then, as population size goes to inﬁnity, and denoting
with N group size, Glaeser and Scheinkman (2002) show that the variance


















They conclude that if one can ﬁnd reasonable upper bounds for the vari-
ances on the right hand side (and for the individual and contextual eﬀects,
c and d), then high aggregate variance can be associated with signiﬁcant
29social interactions. However, it seems that this procedure does not solve
the selection-bias problem. Glaeser and Scheinkman (2002), and Glaeser,
Sacerdote, and Scheinkman (2002) have devised another route to measuring
interactions using macrodata, exploiting the fact that endogenous interac-
tions imply a social multiplier, as described in section 3. If one can identify
the social multiplier, 1/(1 − J), the main parameter of interest, J, is clearly
identiﬁed too. However, this approach requires the a priori exclusion of
sorting, which is an excessively restrictive assumption in many contexts of
interest, although it might well be appropriate in others.
Finally, experimental techniques can be of great help in the empirical
detection of social eﬀects (Durlauf, 2003b, discusses such route in depth).
Several researchers have used experimental settings with random member-
ships (e.g. Sacerdote, 2001, Ichino and Falk, 2003, and Zimmerman, 2003).
However, genuine randomization and reliable extrapolations from a particular
experimental context are not always possible. In this case we need a theory
of group formation in presence of social inﬂuences of the kind sketched in
section 6, in order to correct for self-selection in a microfounded way.
8C o n c l u s i o n s
The paper has discussed an extension of the traditional neoclassical model
to various forms of social interactions, showing how an interactions-based
framework helps us modeling substantive economic phenomena, which elude
conventional economic thinking. The strong point of this research area is
that it brings into economics the richness of sociological and sociopsycholog-
ical explanations of individual behavior. An evident weakness is that social
interactions are incorporated in an extremely stylized fashion. Such weak-
ness is related to the need of keeping the models simple, but I think it stems
mainly from the diﬃculty of clarifying the sources of direct interdependence
aﬀecting economic behavior. Therefore, the issues discussed in section 5 re-
quire more research. Nonetheless, along this research direction, the realism
of economic modeling has deﬁnitely increased. In order to assess the social
interactions approach, the following is a natural question: is such a realism
necessary? At the outset of an old paper become famous for other reasons,
Robert Solow (1956) gave a short methodological lecture:
All theory depends on assumptions which are not quite true. This
is what makes it theory. The art of successful theorizing is to
30make the inevitable simplifying assumptions in such a way that
the ﬁnal results are not very sensitive. A “crucial” assumption is
one on which the conclusions do depend, and it is important that
crucial assumptions be reasonably realistic. (Solow, 1956, p. 65)
As I have argued, the assumption about what kind of interactions are
relevant for economic outcomes is indeed a crucial one, especially with re-
spect to policy conclusions. For instance, the evaluation of a certain policy
is diﬀerent if the social multiplier is greater than one, with respect to the
case in which it is equal to one and so there are no multiplier eﬀects. Since
it seems reasonable that people are aﬀected to some extent by the social
context, interactions-based models have a possible good point in economic
research. This is why I think this is an important research area. In this
regard, Chwe (2003) has written that “the full ﬂowering of this paradigm in
the decades to come might produce work which is comparable to the entire
disciplines of economics and sociology, making these disciplinary categories
seem quaint and archaic” (Chwe, 2003, p. 907). I agree with the view that
the achievement of such an ambitious goal very much depends on whether
the remarkable theoretical advances brought about by the social interactions
approach will ﬁnd an empirical counterpart. The assessment of this research
area also depends on whether extending the set of assumptions is worthy
in terms of additional explicative power. The possible applications I have
described show that such models can explain a variety of interesting and
important economic phenomena, and so I think it is worthy working at the
full ﬂowering of the paradigm. In this respect, the latter is not yet an inter-
disciplinary research area, at least with respect to other research programs,
such as behavioral economics. It is clear that issues such as why people react
to each other in a group, or how groups are formed, cannot be completely
answered within the traditional boundaries of economics, but require the
contribution of social psychology. In this respect, there is a strategic bridge
to be built between behavioral economics and new social economics. Such a
bridge would spur more interdisciplinary work. The latter, in turn, will help
us answer the main unsettled questions in new social economics, namely the
nature and causes of social interactions in market economies, what kind of
interactions are relevant, and who inﬂuences whom with respect to economic
behavior.
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